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The anatomy of Holding Foreign Companies




The bedrock of the US stock market system is high-quality and reliable financial
statements.1
The USA remains a paramount listing location due to the integrity and consistency
furthered by regulations aimed at protecting investors in its markets. Foreign companies
have long been attracted by the markets’ efficiency and liquidity as well as the potential
benefits offered in the form of brand-name enhancement and increased visibility.2
Contributing factors include the US disclosure requirements, efficient regulatory oversight
and enforcement, and strong financing capacity.3 Listing in the USA also gives start-ups
Key points
 Accurate financial statements are critical to investors in making informed decisions and vital to the overall
well-being of the US capital market.
 For cross-listed and multi-jurisdictional businesses, the current regulatory frameworks fail to create
governance equivalency between foreign and US domestic issuers that are listed in the USA.
 The US Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (HFCAA) seeks to level the playing field.
 Companies that use accounting firms which cannot be inspected by the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board for three consecutive years risk being de-listed from US securities exchanges and also
becoming subject to a prohibition in over-the-counter trading in their stock.
 Behind the statutory response in HFCAA are intertwined tensions between stakeholders and sovereigns.
 The key to addressing the current imbalances will be to strike a balance between maintaining the US stock
markets’ open to high-quality foreign issuers and enabling US investors to have access to reliable financial
information.
 It remains uncertain whether the HFCAA will reshape the governance landscape geoeconomically.
* Qingxiu Bu is the Associate Professor, Chair of Global Law Initiative at University of Sussex, UK.
1 Sagar Teotia, Statement on the Continued Importance of High-Quality Financial Reporting for Investors in Light of COVID-19
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19-2020-06-23> accessed 10 August 2021.
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new access to foreign investors and additional credibility. A large number of Chinese com-
panies cross-list in the USA via a variable interest entity (VIE), seeking to establish a reli-
able trading presence for their securities.4 The investment legal vehicle enables them to
hold a controlling interest despite the dearth of the majority of voting rights. Their operat-
ing entities are primarily based in China, where the audit work is also carried out by local
accounting firms. There have long been concerns about the quality and independence of
the audits and financial information of US-listed Chinese companies (ULCCs).5,6
Although VIEs are mostly used for legitimate business purposes, inadequate governance
in this area allows some companies to manipulate their financial statements to hide losses
and fabricate earnings.7 US regulators, such as the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (PCAOB), are not allowed to inspect the work and practices of audit firms based in
China, making it harder to discern whether the financial statements reflect a ULCC’s true
financial position. Given this institutional void, ULCCs are not subject to the same regula-
tory oversight as other companies that trade on US exchanges, resulting in a situation
where there is a double-standard in regulation.
This study proceeds into four parts. Section 2 starts with the Luckin Coffee scandal,
which puts the spotlight on these governance issues with ULCCs. The significance of reli-
able financial statements cannot be overstated for the capital markets, which depends on
high-quality audit services and effective regulatory oversight. Section 3 looks into the cur-
rent unviable de facto two-tier compliance system under which Chinese issuers are subject
to a double-standard inspection. The PCAOB is not allowed to inspect those ULCCs’ audit
papers, and the legal recourse for investors is limited. The conferral of extraterritorial jur-
isdiction on the PCAOB would pave the way to allowing it to discharge its inspection
duties. Section 4 discusses the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (HFCAA),
which was enacted to delist firms that are out of compliance with US audit oversight
requirements for a period of 3 years. HFCAA could inevitably put the ULCCs in a precar-
ious position of trying to comply with conflicting laws in the two jurisdictions. It is worth
exploring whether HFCAA, potentially a nuclear option, is viable as an effective deterrent
against fraud. Section 5 seeks to break the deadlock, exploring potential routes to address
the cross-border challenges of securities governance and financial oversight. A concluding
remark is provided, highlighting that multipronged approaches will help to mitigate the
problem in the current confronting environment.
4 Donald Clarke, ‘The Bonding Effect in Cross-Listed Chinese Companies’ in Robin Hui Huang, Nicholas Howson and Robin
Huang (eds), Enforcement of Corporate and Securities Law (Cambridge University Press 2017) 88–100.
5 Harry Broadman, ‘Forced U.S.–China Decoupling Poses Large Threats’ Forbes (Forbes, Inc., 30 September 2019).
6 James P Naughton and others, ‘SEC Monitoring of Foreign Firms’ Disclosures in the Presence of Foreign Regulators’ (2018) 23
Review of Accounting Studies 1355, 1388.
7 Li Guo, ‘Chinese Style VIEs: Continuing to Sneak Under Smog?’ (2014) 47 Cornell International Law Journal 569, 580.
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2. The scandal of Luckin Coffee
Investors are generally enticed by the massive market potential of China, while capital
markets do not function well without reliable financial information.8 Many ULCCs adopt
VIE and dual-class stock structures, which entails further governance risks with instances
of significant losses for investors.9 The SEC and the PCAOB face significant challenges in
overseeing ULCCs’ auditing papers due to their complex cross-border operation.10 In
addition, China’s intransigence in allowing PCAOB access to those papers renders it nearly
impossible for the US investors to have a true picture of the financial health of those com-
panies.11 This issue has been put in the spotlight in the wake of Luckin Coffee’s implosion,
a fraud which has caused investors to lose billions of US dollars. More problematically,
investors have limited legal resources to hold those China-based perpetrators account-
able.12 As such, companies with primary operations in China that have been listed or in-
tend to be listed in US stock exchanges are increasingly coming under scrutiny.
Luckin Coffee’s systematic fraud
The coffee chain Luckin is the China-based equivalent of Starbucks, and uses data ana-
lytics and artificial intelligence (AI) to improve its operations. Listed on the NASDAQ
stock exchange in May 2019, Luckin Coffee has benefited from reduced cost of capital,
increased liquidity and increased visibility after cross-listing in the USA. It has attracted
high-profile investors, like Credit Suisse, Morgan Stanley, Blackrock and Singapores
sovereign-wealth fund Government Investment Corporation (GIC).
In the bull market, Luckin Coffee adopted novel metrics that flattered performance.13
In order to support its rapid expansion plans, Luckin Coffee is reported to have fabricated
over ¥RMB 2.2 billion ($280 m) in sales for April up to December of 2019.14 Deploying
the metrics to enhance investor confidence, Luckin Coffee is reported to have evolved into
a systemic fraud by fabricating financial and operating numbers, right after its $645 mil-
lion IPOs.15 About US $11 billion in wealth vanished, causing significant losses for many
investors and wiping out billions of dollars of shareholder wealth. Trading in the
8 James Ang, Zhiqian Jiang and Chaopeng Wu, ‘Good Apples, Bad Apples: Sorting among Chinese Companies Traded in the US’
(2016) 134 (4) Journal of Business Ethics 611, 629.
9 Paul Gillis, ‘Testimony before the U.S.–China Security and Economic Commission’ (Washington DC, USCC, 28 February
2019) <https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/gillis%20feb%2028%202019%20testimony.pdf> accessed 10 August 2021.
10 Michelle Lowry and Paul Gillis, ‘Son of Enron: Investors Weigh the Risks of Chinese Variable Interest Entities’ (2014) 26 (3)
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 61, 66.
11 Marco Rubio, ‘You Can’t Trust a Chinese Audit; A New Bill would Ensure that U.S.-Listed Companies Comply with
American Financial Reporting Rules’ The Wall Street Journal (Almar Latour, 4 June 2019).
12 Helen Raleigh, ‘Coronavirus Exposes Another Chinese Scandal: Rampant Corporate Fraud’ The Federalist (Ben Domenech,
13 April 2020).
13 ‘Who’s Lost Their Trunks?’ (2020) 435 (9190) The Economist 49, 50.
14 Ibid.
15 Dave Michaels, ‘SEC Investigates China’s Luckin Coffee over Accounting Scandal; Probe will be a Test of the SECs Ability to
Obtain Information from Abroad’ The Wall Street Journal (Almar Latour, 29 April 2020).
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company’s shares was halted on 6 April 2020 and it was delisted by NASDAQ on 29 June
2020.16 Luckin Coffee’s shares traded on the NASDAQ until 13 July 2020, and the com-
pany has agreed to pay a $180 million penalty to settle accounting fraud charges with the
SEC.17 The scandal marks the worst crisis in confidence for ‘China Inc.’ and shakes the
faith of investors in ULCCs’ corporate governance and financial oversight.18 It is, however,
far from the first time that a US-listed Chinese company has been embroiled in allegations
of accounting manipulation.19 Luckin Coffee’s accounting scandal is underscoring con-
cern over lax corporate governance and financial oversight and putting the spotlight on
ULCCs’ malpractice.
Investors have filed a number of lawsuits against fraud at Luckin Coffee for alleged vio-
lations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.20 It was alleged that the firm had made false
statements, and failed to disclose:
(i) that certain of Luckin Coffee’s financial performance metrics, including
per-store per-day sales, net selling price per item, advertising expenses and rev-
enue contribution from ‘other products’ were inflated;
(ii) that Luckin Coffee’s financial results thus overstated the Company’s financial
health and were consequently unreliable; and
(iii) that, as a result, the Company’s public statements were materially false and mis-
leading at all relevant times.21
Luckin Coffee has faced devastating consequences that went beyond merely being delisted
by NASDAQ. This fraud led to Luckin Coffee paying hefty compensation that has resulted
in its bankruptcy. Luckin Coffee’s collapsing fortunes means losses for investors who
invested in the Company’s 2019 IPO on NASDAQ.22 The SECs ability to thoroughly in-
vestigate the reported misconduct at Luckin Coffee depends on how much information is
shared by Chinese regulators, such as the China Securities Regulatory Commission
(CSRC) and the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR), who have been
staging their own probe.23 However, the US regulatory and judicial agencies face chal-
lenges in enforcing actions against the Company and its directors. One activity of enor-
mous significance is for the US authorities to explore potential legislative reform that can
be taken to mitigate the risk of similar situations from happening.
16 Jing Yang, ‘Luckin Coffee Drops Nasdaq Appeal; Shares to Be Delisted’ The Wall Street Journal (26 June 2020).
17 Alistair Gray, ‘Luckin Coffee to Pay $180m in Accounting Fraud Settlement’ Financial Times (16 December 2020).
18 Jeffrey Mahoney, ‘Inspection of PCAOB-Registered Chinese Auditor’ (Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance,
17 April 2020) <https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/04/17/inspection-of-pcaob-registered-chinese-auditor/#5> accessed 10
August 2021.
19 Nisha Gopalan, ‘Investors Wake Up and Smell the Luckin Coffee’ The Washington Post (3 April 2020).
20 Quentin Webb and Joanne Chiu, ‘Ernst & Young Says It First Found Accounting Issues at Luckin’ The Wall Street Journal (3
April 2020).
21 ‘Luckin Coffee Shareholder Notice: Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP Encourages Investors Who Suffered Losses Investing in Luckin
Coffee Inc’ Bloomberg (4 April 2020).
22 Jing Wang, ‘Banks Stand to Lose More Than $100 Million on Loan to Chairman of China’s Luckin Coffee’ The Wall Street
Journal (6 April 2020).
23 Michaels (n 15).
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Repercussion on ULCCs and potential IPOs
The Luckin Coffee debacle has turned the spotlight back on the accounting risks faced by
investors in ULCCs.24 Fraud allegations for one China-based company led to investors
penalizing other China-based companies’ stock prices, resulting in a spillover effect.25 The
Luckin case has a knock-on effect on other ULCCs as the scandal heightens long-standing
worries over accounting standards at such companies.26 Constraints on oversight raise
company-specific risk, which not only increase uncertainties, but also have broad
confidence-related effects. It will inevitably affect the investors’ confidence and market
momentum on other ULCCs.27 The scandal has tarnished their integrity and diluted trust
by international investors. In the US regulators’ eyes, Chinese companies remain a par-
ticular risk, which has led to increased SEC scrutiny of China-based issuers.28
The US regulators seek to implement a higher threshold for companies that wish to
access capital markets. In response to the paramount challenge of auditor quality, the
PCAOB was established under Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 and is overseen by the SEC.29
It is tasked with policing the accounting firms that sign off on the books of the US-listed
companies.30 There should be a price for disregarding the rules of responsible financial en-
gagement. Those ULCCs that do not make their audits available for PCAOB review will be
subject to increased disclosure requirements. The market for Chinese IPOs in the USA is
bound to suffer. The Luckin fraud undermines confidence more broadly, which will affect
potential US IPOs from China.31 It has disrupted dozens of IPOs, intensifying investor
concerns about the amount of trust they can place in audited financial results in China.
The situation underscores the tension underlying Chinese companies looking to list on
US exchanges, which are set to face substantial challenges and much tighter scrutiny. As a
matter of fact, PCAOB has re-evaluated its approach to new registration applications from
firms in China, and legislators have considered imposing further restrictions on Chinese
access to US listing opportunities. The new rules would require higher accountability
standards to qualify for listing. With tightened listings rules, the US stock exchanges are
also trying to curb IPOs of Chinese companies closely held by insiders and which are opa-
que about accounting.32
24 Hudson Lockett, Thomas Hale and Henny Sender, ‘Luckin Debacle Shakes Investor Faith in New York’s China Listings’
Financial Times (12 April 2020).
25 Masako N Darrough, Rong Bing Huang and Sha Zhao, ‘Spillover Effects of Fraud Allegations and Investor Sentiment’ (2020)
37 (2) Contemporary Accounting Research 982–1014. ]
26 Lockett (n 24).
27 Jeanny Yu, Vinicy Chan and Daniela Wei, ‘Luckin Coffee Scandal Deals New Blow to Corporate China’ Bloomberg (3 April
2020).
28 Jay Clayton and others, ‘Emerging Market Investments Entail Significant Disclosure, Financial Reporting and Other Risks;
Remedies are Limited’ (Washington DC, SEC, 21 April 2020) <https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/emerging-market-
investments-disclosure-reporting> accessed 10 August 2021.
29 Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 s101 (a); 15 US Code §7211.
30 Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 s101 (c) (3); 15 US Code §7211.
31 Julie Zhu and Zhang Yan, ‘Scrutiny Mounts on China’s Luckin Coffee as Market Regulator Inspects’ Reuters (27 April 2020).
32 Echo Wang, ‘Nasdaq to Tighten Listing Rules, Restricting Chinese IPOs-Sources’ Nasdaq (18 May 2020).
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Inadequate oversight of audits
The reliability of financial statements is one of several challenges faced by investors. The
role of IPO advisers has come under greater scrutiny, including whether the auditors
involved performed adequate due diligence on Luckin Coffee.33 A ULCC is generally aud-
ited by auditors based in China. The combined revenue from Chinese affiliations of the
Big Four made up 26 per cent of the total Chinese accounting market; the Big Four audit
about half of all Chinese-listed companies in the USA.34 The auditor of Luckin Coffee Inc.
has been Ernst & Young Hua Ming LLP, a PCAOB-registered firm since 2004 and thus
eligible to serve as lead auditor on the audits of ULCCs.35 Nevertheless, it has never
been subject to a PCAOB inspection. It was the Chinese arm of Ernst & Young, Luckin
Coffee’s auditor, that confirmed the fraud. The Ernst & Young findings came only
after multiple reports by short-sellers that questioned the authenticity of Luckin
Coffees sales and other key figures.36 Confidence in the auditor of Luckin Coffee will
be even more critical in light of apparent control failures at the Company. Luckin
Coffee’s fraud has brought up further questions concerning the auditing process, that
is, how such a major fraud could not have been caught by auditors until so far down
the line. Another key concern is whether Ernst & Young, the listing intermediary,
could be held accountable with regard to the failure to detect the fraud. A critical con-
cern is whether it is in the interest of US investors that Ernst & Young Hua Ming LLP
should remain a PCAOB-registered firm, and whether PCAOB should deregister them
for their role in the debacle.37 This scandal represents another blow to PCAOB’s confi-
dence in the processes of audit firms that it has not been permitted to inspect for
more than a decade.38
3. The unviable and unsustainable de facto two-tier compliance
system
Confidence in the quality and reliability of financial statements is driven by a combination
of quality audit services and regulatory oversight.39 PCAOB’s inspections are used to
make certain that audits of US-listed companies must comply with US auditing standards.
However, the US regulators face significant challenges in overseeing the financial reporting
for ULCCs. The PCAOB cannot inspect audit work and practices of PCAOB-registered
accounting firms in China with respect to their audit work of US reporting companies.
33 Jacky Wong, ‘Chinese Growth Becomes a Tougher Sell on Wall Street: Accounting Fraud Highlights Corporate-Governance
Concerns’ The Wall Street Journal (9 April 2020).
34 Wei Zhou and Hong Shen, ‘Chinese Auditors Are on the Hook after Clients Are Caught Cooking the Books’ The Wall Street
Journal (2 August 2019).
35 Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 ss106A (1) and (2).
36 Lockett (n 24).
37 Bob Pisani, ‘Luckin Coffee is a Painful Reminder of “the Extreme Fraud Risk” of Some China-Based Companies’ CNBC (3
April 2020).
38 Mahoney (n 18).
39 Clayton and others (n 2).
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Such barriers undermine the fair and transparent financial reporting at the heart of the US
capital markets. As a result, ULCCs are generally not subject to the same requirements as
apply to domestic US issuers. Such differences impact the quality of information provided
to investors.
Longstanding deadlock: the PCAOB’s inability to inspect audit work papers
in China
As the US government’s principal audit watchdog, the PCAOB conducts regular inspec-
tions of both foreign and domestic registered public accounting firms.40 It is empowered
to bar firms that violate its rules from auditing companies that trade on US exchanges.41
Information necessary for PCAOB’s regulatory oversight is not always available from for-
eign jurisdictions, which holds particularly true with regard to Chinese accounting firms.
Neither PCAOB’s direct investigations in China nor the providing of documentation to
PCAOB is allowed under the Chinese law.42 The PCAOB’s inability to inspect Chinese
issuers’ audit work has adversely affected investors, who cannot receive the tangible,
quality-enhancing benefits they should have received from PCAOB inspections.43
PCAOB: the gatekeepers’ gatekeeper
PCAOB’s inspections and SEC regulatory activities help to improve audit quality for the
inspected Chinese auditors’ US-listed clients.44 PCAOB has built an effective system for
registration, inspection, rule-making and enforcement, so as to provide essential safe-
guards.45 PCAOB seeks to protect investors in the US capital markets by ensuring that
audit firms adhere to PCAOB standards. It oversees the audits of public companies, and
its inspection power transcends borders. The inspections are a key component of the US
regulatory efforts to enhance the quality of financial reporting and ensure audit quality.46
Non-US accounting firms must register with the PCAOB and abide by its guidelines if
they intend to issue audit reports for US-listed firms.47 In view of jurisdiction, any audit
firm that registers with the PCAOB is legally obligated to provide documents regardless of
40 Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 ss101C (3) and (4).
41 Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 s105 (b) (3) (A) (i); 15 US Code §7215.
42 US Department of the Treasury, ‘President’s Working Group on Financial Markets Releases Report and Recommendations
on Protecting Investors from Significant Risks from Chinese Companies’ (6 August 2020) https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-
releases/sm1086 (accessed 10 August 2021).
43 Phillip Lamoreaux, ‘Does PCAOB Inspection Access Improve Audit Quality? An Examination of Foreign Firms Listed in the
United States’ (2016) 61 Journal of Accounting & Economics 313, 337.
44 James R Doty, ‘The Relevance, Role, and Reliability of Audits in the Global Economy’ (2012) 90 Texas Law Review 1891,
1911.
45 Brandon Gipper, Christian Leuz and Mark Maffett, ‘Public Oversight and Reporting Credibility: Evidence from the PCAOB
Audit Inspection Regime’ (2020) 33 The Review of Financial Studies 4532–4579.
46 Jay Clayton and others, ‘Statement on Continued Dialogue with Audit Firm Representatives on Audit Quality in China and
Other Emerging Markets’ (Washington DC, SEC, 19 February 2020) <https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-
audit-quality-china-2020-02-19> accessed 10 August 2021.
47 PCAOB, ‘Public Companies that are Audit Clients of PCAOB-Registered Firms from Non-U.S. Jurisdictions where the
PCAOB is Denied Access to Conduct Inspections’ (Washington DC, PCAOB, 1 April 2020) <https://pcaobus.org/International/
Inspections/Pages/IssuerClientsWithoutAccess.aspx> accessed 10 August 2021.
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their locations. SEC and PCAOB jointly acknowledged that ‘for investors, both US and
non-US investors, US listing carries with it the assumption that US rules and regulatory
oversight apply’.48 Thus, PCAOB has jurisdiction over companies listed on the US stock
exchanges that are based in China.49 It is worth noting that some gatekeepers, to a greater
extent, play a rubber-stamp role in detecting and deterring financial fraud.50 Rather than
acting as gatekeepers, some accounting firms have turned a blind eye to their clients’ fabri-
cated financial statements. For instance, they do not have access to those company’s actual
books and records, despite their signing off on company financial statements in China.
Forbid PCAOB’s inspection on grounds of national security and state secrecy
China has routinely denied access to overseas regulators, arguing that allowing the USA to
enforce US laws in China would violate its national sovereignty and risks disclosure of
state secrets.51 Chinese laws have been invoked to limit foreign access to China-based
audit work papers. A newly effective law has essentially codified the position:52 the
amended China Securities Law (CSL 2020) coming into effect on 1 March 2020 requires
that financial records remain in China and also bars foreigners from sharing information
on grounds that it might contain state secrets.53 The CSL 2020 has far-reaching conse-
quences on auditors as well as Chinese issuers listed on the US stock exchanges. It restricts
the auditors documentation of work performed in China from being transferred outside
the country.54 In addition, the China National Security Law (NSL 2015) limits US
regulators’ ability to oversee the financial reporting of Chinese issuers,55 but also shields
them from complying with the US laws for financial transparency and accountability. The
NSL 2015 is invoked at times to limit US regulators’ ability to oversee the financial report-
ing of ULCCs. These laws create obstacles to cross-border flows of information between
regulators and China-domiciled registrants, thus complicating and impeding the
PCAOB’s ability to carry out regulatory responsibilities.
Furthermore, positions taken by the CSRC impair the PCAOB’s ability to conduct
inspections in China, even though these firms are registered with the PCAOB. CSRC does
not permit the PCAOB to inspect its public accounting firms or provide sufficient access
to inspect and investigate the audits of such ULCCs. The PCAOB has run into obstacles
inspecting the work of the auditors hired by 224 US-listed companies, primarily from the
48 Clayton and others (n 2).
49 Shaswat Das, ‘Chinese Investment in the United States: Impacts and Issues for Policymakers’ (Washington DC, Testimony be-
fore the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 26 January 2017) <https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Das_
USCC%20Hearing%20Testimony012617.pdf>.
50 Qingxiu Bu, ‘Suspension of Chinese Units of “Big 4” Audit Firms: The Question of Moral Turpitude’ in Susan Watson and
PM Vasudev (eds), Global Capital Markets: A Survey of Legal and Regulatory Trends (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017) 35, 61.
51 Colleen Honigsberg, ‘The Case for Individual Audit Partner Accountability’ (2019) 72 (6) The Vanderbilt Law Review 101,
151.
52 Cydney Posner, ‘SEC Preparing Proposals to Implement Recommendations Regarding Emerging Market Listings’ Harvard
Law School Forum on Corporate Governance (Harvard Law School, 30 August 2020).
53 China Securities Law (hereinafter referred to as CSL 2020) art 177.
54 David Alexander, ‘US Lawmakers Push U.S.-Listed Chinese Firms to Comply with Financial Oversight’ Reuters (6 June 2019).
55 National Security Law of the Peoples Republic of China (NSL 2015) arts 59; 77 (7).
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Chinese mainland, of which more than 130 issuers are audit clients of PCAOB-registered
firms.56 The SEC and PCAOB face challenges from Chinese laws that impede effective
regulation, supervision and enforcement. Neither the SEC and PCAOB have access to
accounting documents, nor can they promote and enforce disclosure standards for US-
listed companies operating in China.57 The restriction results in additional challenges to
disclosure and transparency requirements for ULCCs. The inability to achieve efficient
regulatory cooperation with Chinese authorities raises a number of concerns about invest-
or protection. Information barriers that inhibit PCAOB’s oversight may allow bad actors
to more effectively hide fraud. Given the recent surge in the number of ULCCs, the
PCAOB has sought, without success, inspections of China-based audit firms and the
mainland affiliates of the Big Four accountancy firms.58 Unsuccessful resolution of these
obstacles entails the continuing inability of PCAOB to inspect PCAOB-registered firms.59
As such, a de facto two-tier compliance system has come into being.
A de facto double-standard compliance system
The flow of international capital investment presents substantial challenges for the US reg-
ulators to ensure a level playing field in transparency and accountability in financial
reporting globally. Legal obligations have been established to render foreign issuer govern-
ance equivalent to domestic issuers to protect investors. US securities laws that apply to
the ULCCs should be the same as those that apply to US public companies. Given that US
enforcement is severely limited, investors are left potentially exposed to significant risks.
Unequitable disclosure regimes due to the de facto double standard
Accurate and reliable audited financial statements are critical to investors in making
informed decisions and are vital to the overall well-being of the US capital market.60
Chinese firms are allowed to be cross-listed on US stock exchanges even though they are
shielded from PCAOB’s inspections but they should subject themselves to the stricter US
legal environment and enhanced disclosure requirements for the sake of the investor pro-
tection.61 The current de facto two-tiered system renders it a paramount challenge to en-
sure that all companies on the US stock exchanges are subject to the same standards and
regulations. A number of ULCCs do not meet the same disclosure and auditing standards,
despite that they are subject to the same requirements as their domestic US counterparts.
The Chinese firms receive, in effect, preferential treatment over the latter. There is a risk of
increased financial fraud arising from the resultant de facto gap in disclosure and auditing
56 Doty (n 44).
57 Clayton and others (n 28).
58 Matthew Miller, ‘US, HK Regulators Struggle to Get China Audit Papers’ Reuters (20 December 2017).
59 PCAOB, ‘Consideration of Registration Applications from Public Accounting Firms in Non-US Jurisdictions Where There
Are Unresolved Obstacles to PCAOB Inspections’ (Washington DC, PCAOB Rel. No 2010-007, 7 October 2010) <https://pcaobus.
org/International/Inspections/Documents/Registration_of_Non-US_Firms.pdf> accessed 10 August 2021.
60 David Sherman and David Young, ‘Where Financial Reporting Still Falls Short’ (2016) 6 Harvard Business Review 76, 84.
61 Andrew Karolyi, ‘The World of Cross-Listings and Cross-Listings of the World: Challenging Conventional Wisdom’ (2006)
10 (1) Review of Finance 99, 152.
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standards, which ultimately is unviable and unacceptable. This risk is likely to remain a
long-standing challenge given that the potential rewards are so high, while the risks from
getting caught are minimal. In consequence, the ULCCs do not have the same incentives
to provide a true picture of their financial health to investors as domestic US issuers.62
Significant American capital is exposed to the risk created by Chinas lack of economic
transparency.63 US regulators can neither inspect such companies for compliance with US
laws nor take enforcement action when laws are violated. With the asymmetric issue unad-
dressed, the risk will be borne by investors, making them a ripe target for companies that
exhibit far less transparency relative to other global peers forced to meet high disclosure
requirements.64
Level the playing field via legislative reforms
Accountability for issuers and gatekeepers is a key aspect of US securities law. Companies
in China generally are not subject to the same standards as applied within the USA.65 The
differences inevitably impact the quality of information provided to investors. Both
Chinese and US domestic publicly listed firms should be committed to compliance follow-
ing the same standard. The issue of extraterritoriality makes it nearly impossible for
PCAOB to conduct the same level of due diligence for ULCCs, which poses insurmount-
able challenges to the US enforcement efforts. This puts the SEC and PCAOB in a precar-
ious position to ensure compliance with audit requirements, and protect US investors
who are interested in these securities.66 Given the significant information barriers that per-
sist, remedial actions involving US-listed Chinese companies are of considerable signifi-
cance. The long-standing deadlock catalyses a systematic and hard-line strategy on the
Chinese firms. Changes need to be made to level the playing field for domestic US compa-
nies competing for the same capital. As such, the USA has been seeking to enact new laws
to allow for tighter listing standards for companies based in a jurisdiction where its laws
and regulations restrict PCAOB’s access to information. On a statutory footing, the SEC
will be authorized to delist a company if PCAOB cannot access its audit.
4. Would HFCAA be a panacea?
Trump’s trade war with China has set in motion some efforts to decouple the world’s two
biggest economies,67 which is also manifested in the capital markets. As the frontline
guardians of accurate financial statements, the PCAOB considers examining whether
62 Honigsberg (n 51).
63 Rubio (n 11).
64 Joe Liebkind, ‘Loophole Exploitation Aggravates Chinese and Foreign Regulators’ International Policy Digest (26 September
2019).
65 SEC, ‘Disclosure Considerations for China-Based Issuers’ (Washington DC, SEC, 23 November 2020) <https://www.sec.gov/
corpfin/disclosure-considerations-china-based-issuers> accessed 10 August 2021.
66 Jane Fuller, ‘Time for the Big Four to Rethink Auditing’s Purpose’ Financial Times (7 January 2020).
67 Edward Wong, ‘Chinese Coffee Chain’s Scandal Renews U.S. Calls for Oversight’ The New York Times (New York, U.S., 30
April 2020).
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some of the PCAOB-registered firms located in China should be deregistered.68 As dis-
cussed above, Information asymmetry, Chinese IPOs lack of accounting transparency and
close ties to powerful insiders leave investors facing a higher risk of fraud.69 One of the le-
gislative intentions behind HFCAA is to force ULCCs to play by the same transparency
rules as those from other parts of the world, meanwhile allowing the PCAOB to inspect
audits of them.70 Another major concern about HFCAA is that it may have an adverse ef-
fect on US capital markets. Some ULCCs are already dually listed or preparing for dual
listings to reduce the impact of any potential US action.71
Mandatory inspection and enhanced disclosure commitment
In practice, a failure to provide the SEC with full audit reports will generate its own penal-
ties through lower share prices as investors mark these stocks down.72 Due largely to an in-
creasingly complicated structure in which Chinese firms manage to get listed in the USA,
the existing regulatory framework is inadequate to address the risk of fraud. Luckin Coffee
is a wake-up call for US policy makers, regulators and investors about the risk of extreme
fraud that Chinese companies pose to the US capital market. It is essential to adopt a dras-
tic step of compulsory delisting that would strengthen the precaution system while safe-
guarding the integrity of the US capital market. HFCAA aims to mandate the delisting of
foreign companies that fail to comply with auditing regulations. A clear message is that all
ULCCs must be committed to financial transparency and accountability under the US
securities law, which is a prerequisite to be listed on US exchanges.
A real game changer?
The purpose of HFCAA is to ensure that audits of ULCCs can be inspected by the
PCAOB, and thus enhance transparency. The legislative intent behind the HFCAA is to
better inform investors about their exposure to financial risks, delist non-compliant
issuers and ban those firms that flaunt investor protections from entering US capital mar-
kets.73 HFCAA would force US-listed Chinese firms to submit to more regulatory over-
sight or face delisting. HFCAA requires Chinese companies to establish that they are not
owned or controlled by a foreign government and submit to an audit that the PCAOB can
review.74 It is aimed to address long-standing unfair practices arising from China’s sub-
stantial subsidies for its state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which constitutes unfair
68 Mahoney (n 18).
69 Wang (n 32).
70 Jesse Fried, ‘Why Trump’s Attempt to Delist China from US will Backfire’ Financial Times (13 January 2021).
71 Joanne Chiu, ‘Two Chinese Tech Firms Prepare Hong Kong Listings as US Pressure Rises’ The Wall Street Journal (27 May
2020).
72 Kevin Rudd, ‘Has the “Great Decoupling Gone Viral?’ Project Syndicate (7 February 2020) .
73 U.S. Senators Marco Rubio (R-FL) and Bob Casey (D-PA), ‘Rubio, Colleagues Introduce Bipartisan, Bicameral Bill to Ban
Chinese & Foreign Firms that Flaunt US Laws from U.S. Exchanges’ (Washington DC, 5 June 2019). <https://www.rubio.senate.
gov/public/index.cfm/2019/6/rubio-colleagues-introduce-bipartisan-bicameral-bill-to-ban-chinese-foreign-firms-that-flaunt-u-s-
laws-from-u-s-exchanges> accessed 10 August 2021.
74 HFCAA s2.
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competition with their foreign counterparts.75 In addition, HFCAA requires ULCCs to
comply with US auditing and reporting requirements. Amending the Sarbanes–Oxley Act
(SOX 2002),76 the law requires each ‘covered issuer’ to disclose annually to the SEC the:
(1) provisions of laws or rules in foreign jurisdictions that prevent the PCAOB from performing its
inspections of auditors located in such foreign jurisdictions; and
(2) date when such provisions no longer prevent said PCAOB inspections.77
The law authorizes the SEC to prohibit trading in a company if the PCAOB is unable to
review company audits.78 If the PCAOB is prevented from carrying out an inspection of
the auditor for three consecutive years, the SEC is authorized to prohibit the covered
issuer’s securities from being traded on a national securities exchange,79 unless such cov-
ered issuer certifies to the SEC that it will retain a registered public accounting firm that
the PCAOB is able to inspect.80 The Chinese situation falls squarely under Section 2(A) of
HFCAA, where a ULCC:
employs an auditing firm located in a foreign jurisdiction, and to which the PCAOB lacks the abil-
ity to inspect the audits conducted by those firms under section 3(A) of the Act.81
If any of these Chinese Companies is a foreign issuer82 and has a registered public
accounting firm described in Section 2 of this Act and prepares an audit report during a
non-inspection year, it must make additional disclosure.83 During a non-inspection year,
the foreign non-inspected issuer must disclose, among other things, the percentage of its
shares owned by government entities in its home jurisdiction and whether government
entities in the foreign jurisdiction have a controlling financial interest in such a foreign
reporting issuer.84 The demand for a full disclosure of state ownership further complicates
the issue politically.
In terms of financial transparency and accountability, HFCAA sends a clear message to
the Chinese policymakers and regulators. If China continues to refuse to allow PCAOB to
conduct inspections, then its companies will not have access to the US market. Making
common-sense changes to level the playing field, HFCAA seeks and provides investors the
75 Chad P Bown and Jennifer A Hillman, ‘WTO’ing a Resolution to the China Subsidy Problem’ (Washington DC, PIIE,
October 2019) <https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/documents/wp19-17.pdf> accessed 10 August 2021.
76 Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (15 USC §7214).
77 A ‘covered issuer’ is a reporting company with a registered public accounting firm that (i) is located in a foreign jurisdiction
and (ii) the PCAOB is unable to inspect because of the applicability of laws or rules of such foreign jurisdiction.
78 HFCAA s2(i)(3).
79 Covered issuers are defined as those required to file periodic reports under ss 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.
80 HFCAA (n 74).
81 HFCAA ss2 (a), 3(a).
82 17 CFR § 240.3b–4(b): the term ‘foreign issuer’ means any issuer which is a foreign government, a national of any foreign
country or a corporation or other organization incorporated or organized under the laws of any foreign country.
83 HFCAA s3(b)(2): ‘the percentage of the shares of the issuer owned by governmental entities in the foreign jurisdiction in
which the issuer is incorporated or otherwise organized’.
84 HFCAA ss3(b)(2) and (3).
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transparency they need to make well-informed decisions.85 It could potentially change the
current equation. However, it remains ambiguous what consequence the Chinese firms
that fall under Section 2(A) of HFCAA face if they fail to certify that they are not owned
or controlled by the Chinese government. It is unclear whether they would be permitted
to continue being listed or forced to delist from the US exchanges. It remains to be seen
whether the disclosure of ULCCs’ ownership structure would achieve HFCAA’s legislative
intent. It is similarly unclear what constitutes ‘owned or controlled by a foreign govern-
ment’ for purposes of HFCAA. The term ‘foreign private issuer’ does not exclude a com-
pany that is ‘owned or controlled’ by a foreign government.86 It seems intended that such
an issuer should not be owned or controlled by a government entity in a foreign
jurisdiction.87
Dilemma: between a rock and hard place
A regulatory gap arises when foreign issuers move from a weak governance regime to a
stronger one as result of a cross-border listing.88 HFCAA seeks to bridge the visible gap by
equipping the SEC with powerful enforcement mechanisms through which the agency
could delist a foreign entity skirting PCAOB’s audit inspections. Chinese issuers are sub-
ject to jurisdiction-based regulatory requirements. HFCAA could create a compliance di-
lemma for ULCCs, which are actually caught in a proverbial situation, ie between a rock
and hard place. A deadlock hence arises in terms of a failure either to conform to the US
disclosure rules or comply with the Chinese law. The compliance dilemma is fundamen-
tally rooted in the tension between the laws of China, and the US HFCAA presents a di-
lemma for the ULCCs insofar as they will be required to comply with directly conflicting
laws. If Chinese firms intend to be listed on the US stock exchanges, by implication they
are committed to complying with US laws and regulations on financial transparency and
accountability. It is the Chinese law that prevents them from complying with disclosure
rules and SEC audit. Chinese issuers often argue that they are normally caught between a
rock and hard place, having to decide whether to break the Chinese or the US law.89
From a perspective of auditors, the PCAOB could deregister accounting firms that it is
unable to inspect. The termination would lead to the delisting of shares of companies,
since financial statements audited by a PCAOB registered accounting firm are a prerequis-
ite condition for continued listing. The suspension of the Big Four epitomizes the
85 Daniel Flatley and Ben Bain, ‘Senate Overwhelmingly Approves Bill to Delist Certain Chinese Companies’ Fortune (Fortune
Media Group Holdings, 20 May 2020).
86 Amended SOX 2002 s104(i)(2)(B).
87 HFCAA s2(2)(B).
88 Amir Licht, ‘Cross-Listing and Corporate Governance: Bonding or Avoiding?’ (2003) 4 (1) Chicago Journal of
International Law 141, 163.
89 USCC, ‘Chinese Investment in the United States: Impacts and Issues for Policymakers—Hearing before the United States-
China Economic and Security Review Commission’ (Washington DC, USCC, 26 January 2017) <https://www.uscc.gov/sites/de
fault/files/transcripts/Chinese%20Investment%20in%20the%20United%20States%20Transcript.pdf> accessed 10 August 2021.
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PCAOB’s enforcement action, because their subsidiaries based in China have failed to co-
operate in PCAOB investigations of their audit work.90 A plausible challenge would be
how to apply HFCAA if most ULCCs would be unable to file audited financial statements
with the SEC.
The potential collateral consequences on ULCCs
HFCAA threatens to delist from US exchanges any firm which fails to provide regular aud-
ited reports to the PCAOB. Failure to satisfy this listing standard would put the company
at risk of delisting. This would considerably affect ULCCs in that many of them have failed
to comply. The rising USA–China tensions could negatively influence investor sentiment
towards Chinese stocks, and the implementation of HFCAA could have a negative impact
on ULCCs, which would likely respond by seeking dual listing. One option would be a sec-
ondary listing elsewhere and giving investors new shares in exchange for the US stocks,
which could help them alleviate both regulatory and investor concerns. Given the di-
lemma between a rock and hard place, HFCAA would likely affect Chinese firms’ willing-
ness to list in the USA. This would also provide an opportunity to attract Chinese
companies for the US’s rival stock exchanges, such as Hong Kong, London and China’s
newly launched STAR market for start-ups.
Alternatives remain uncertain: LSE vis-à-vis HKSE
It is imperative for ULCCs to continue accessing global capital markets to balance the cur-
rent account.91 They may explore alternative listing venues prior to proceeding with the
delisting process in the USA. One option would be a secondary listing elsewhere and giv-
ing investors new shares in exchange for the US stocks.92 The result of a mass delisting
would likely be a surge of IPOs on the Hong Kong exchange.z93 The ‘differential voting
rights (DVRs)’ prevented many Chinese firms from previously accessing the Hong Kong
Stock Exchange (HKSE) and London Stock Exchange (LSE). The DVR refers to the issu-
ance of multiple classes of shares, each of which entitles the holders to different voting
rights. In certain circumstances, this results in investors holding majority economic own-
ership of a company, but not necessarily commanding the majority voting rights.94 This
innovative design of voting rights makes it more attractive for Chinese firms incorporated
in offshore havens, which helps owners maintain a tiered voting structure.95 HKSE has
90 Michael Rapoport, ‘SEC, Big Four Accounting Firms in China Settle Dispute’ The Wall Street Journal (6 February 2015).
91 Chutian Zhou, ‘Why Are Chinese Stocks Dropping in the US?’ The Diplomat (Washington DC, U.S., 26 May 2020).
92 John Ruwitch and Alun John, ‘What Delisting Chinese Firms from U.S. Stock Markets Could Mean’ Reuters (London UK, 30
September 2019).
93 David Gomulya and others, ‘Crossed Wires: Endorsement Signals and the Effects of IPO Firm De-Listings on Venture
Capitalists Reputations’ (2019) 62 (3) Academy of Management Journal 641, 666.
94 Coffee (n 3).
95 David C Donald, ‘“Market Quality” and Moral Hazard in Financial Market Design’ in Ross P Buckley, Emilios Avgouleas and
Douglas W Arner (eds), Reconceptualising Global Finance and its Regulation (Cambridge University Press 2016) 217–35.
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since changed its stance towards dual-class shares which assign different voting rights (like
DVRs), paving the way for a secondary offering of Alibaba shares in its exchanges.96
In 2018, HKSE changed its rules to allow companies with dual-class shares to list, which
also instituted landmark revisions to the Hang Seng Index.97 The HKSE Listing Rules
offers a new concessionary route which allows firms that are already primarily listed on a
Qualifying Exchange, including the NYSE, NASDAQ and the Main Market of the LSE, to
apply for a secondary listing in Hong Kong.98 The listing reforms will pave the way for
ULCCs to list in the HKSE. Alibaba’s secondary listing in Hong Kong in November 2019
has netted the company nearly US$13 billion in additional capital.99 Alibabas success has
mainstreamed a growing trend of secondary listings by massive Chinese companies in the
technology sector. JD.com Inc. and NetEase Inc. were secondarily listed in HKSE in April
and June 2020, which raised US$4 billion and US$2.8 billion respectively.100 Hong Kong
seemingly emerges as a leading fundraising hub for Chinese tech companies. Nevertheless,
erosion of the rule of law in Hong Kong could lessen future foreign capital inflows, ultim-
ately impacting Hong Kong’s status as an international financial centre.101 This is especial-
ly true in terms of the delisting and relisting strategy exploited by many Cayman-
incorporated companies.102
The LSE is viewed as another main alternative.103 The London-Shanghai Stock Connect
(LSSC), a scheme between LSE and Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE), was launched in
2019. The LSSC was designed to allow eligible companies listed in each market to issue on
the other exchange a depositary receipt that can be traded under local rules in the local
time zone.104 Shanghai-listed A-share companies wishing to be traded in the LSE may do
so through the issuance of Global Depositary Receipts while London-listed companies
may list on the SSE directly by issuing Chinese Depositary Receipts.105 From China’s per-
spective, there is no ready alternative to the diversity, depth and liquidity of US capital
markets.106 Despite a suspension of the LSSC in early 2020 due to HK frictions, China
may use it as a hedge against moves by the USA to make it harder for Chinese companies
to be listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ. 107 The LSSC could open up an opportunity for
96 Vijay Govindarajan and others, ‘Should Dual-Class Shares Be Banned?’ Harvard Business Review (Harvard Business
Publishing, 3 December 2018).
97 Noah Sin and others, ‘Hong Kongs Hang Seng benchmark paves way to include Alibaba’ Reuters (London UK,18 May 2020).
98 HKSE Listing Rules ch 19C.
99 Stu Woo, ‘Alibaba Shares Enjoy a Strong Start in Hong Kong’ The Wall Street Journal (Almar Latour, 26 November 2019).
100 Chiu (n 71).
101 Bobby V Reddy, ‘Finding the British Google: Relaxing the Prohibition of Dual-Class Stock from the Premium-Tier of the
London Stock Exchange’ (2020) 79 (2) Cambridge Law Journal 315, 348.
102 Liebkind (n 64).
103 Kenneth Rapoza, ‘China Tries Getting out Ahead of NYSE, Nasdaq “Delisting”’ Forbes (Forbes, Inc.,19 May 2020).
104 Mike Bird, ‘The Shanghai–London Stock Link Is a Financial White Elephant’ The Wall Street Journal (3 January 2020).
105 Lerong Lu and Ningyao Ye, ‘Shanghai–London Stock Connect: Operating Mechanism, Opportunities, and Challenges’
(2019) 34 (10) Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 684, 687.
106 Kevin Rudd, Defining the Great Global Decoupling (Asian Society Policy Institute 4 November 2019) <https://asiasociety.
org/policy-institute/events/defining-great-global-decoupling> accessed 10 August 2021.
107 Yu Sun, Yuan Yang and Philip Stafford, ‘China Halts London Listing Tie-up after HK Fictions’ Financial Times (London
UK, 3 January 2020).
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Chinese companies to raise foreign capital in London. Such migration could be promising
for companies seeking a fresh injection of capital in a new market.108 In addition, the
LSE’s junior market (AIM) has a fast track route to listing for issuers already listed on
designated markets including the top tier markets of NASDAQ and NYSE.109 With the
publication of Lord Hills Review on the UK Listing Regime on 3 March 2021,110 it is
anticipated that proposed changes to the UK listing rules will make it more attractive for
fast-growing technology and other companies to list in London, and thus LSE’s competi-
tiveness will be enhanced. It remains to be seen which one could be a game changer be-
tween the LSE and HKSE.
China’s Star Market: a worthy rival of the NASDAQ?
Shenzhen and Shanghai could be beneficiaries with Hong Kong in turmoil.111 Hong
Kong’s rule of law along with its open capital environment have long been its advantages
over Shenzhen Stock Exchange and SSE. The recent issue of the National Security Law
casts a cloud over the financial centre’s future.112 For instance, the Hang Seng Index fell
nearly 6 per cent right after the passing of the law on 30 June 2020.113 China has estab-
lished decade-old NASDAQ-like listing venues to attract tech start-ups in Beijing,
Shenzhen and Shanghai.114 In June 2019, the SSE launched the NASDAQ-like Star Market
which allows pre-profit companies in areas such as AI and cloud computing to list in
China for the first time. The pressure to abide by more stringent disclosure requirements
in the USA could be one reason why some Chinese companies are looking elsewhere.
Since the Star Market is less accessible to foreign investors to attract more listings, it
remains uncertain as to whether the SSE Star Market could become a worthy rival of the
NASDAQ.
Race to the bottom vis-à-vis race to the top
There is increasingly fierce competition to attract listings across jurisdictions. In the case
of a dual-listing, the issuer will need to coordinate disclosure of inside information across
108 Nicholas M Hanna and Mark Tan, ‘London’s New Appeal for Chinese Companies Looking to List’ National Law Review (29
May 2020).
109 London Stock Exchange, ‘AIM’ <https://www.londonstockexchange.com/raise-finance/equity/aim> accessed 10 August
2021.
110 UK HM Treasury, ‘Terms of Reference: Lord Hill’s Review on Listings’ UK HM Treasury (London, 5 March 2021) <https://
www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-listings-review/terms-of-reference-lord-hills-review-on-listings> accessed 10 August 2021.
111 Jacky Wong, ‘Chinese Companies Fleeing New York Will Find Warm Welcome at Home’ The Wall Street Journal (25 May
2020).
112 China’s National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) passed a national security law (NSL) for the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) on 30 June 2020. ‘Can Hong Kong Remain a Global Financial Centre?’ Economist (6 June
2020).
113 Sherisse Pham, ‘Hang Seng Index Has Worst Day Since 2015 as Tensions Flare up again between China and the West’ CNN
Business (22 May 2020).
114 Shen Hong, ‘First IPO on China’s Nasdaq-Style Tech Board Sparks a Small Frenzy’ The Wall Street Journal (26 June 2019).
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the two markets. Exchanges have plausibly fewer incentives to impose strict listing and
governance rules, lest they lose a listing to a foreign competitor.115 The Star Market’s list-
ing requirements are less stringent as compared to the NASDAQ. The potential listing of
Saudi Aramco shares has at once prompted the LSE to propose a relaxation of its listing
standards for sovereign issuers on the premium listing tier.116 It has been argued that
offering valuable SOEs, like Saudi Aramco, preferential treatment, the Financial Conduct
Authority would put investors at serious risk.117 HFCAA and NASDAQ’s tightening of its
listing requirements prove positive for the integrity of the US markets, as Luckin Coffee is
not the first ULCC to have imploded due to a governance scandal.118 On the one hand, a
‘race to the top’ approach in US governance could potentially lead some weak ULCCs to
seek a dual listing elsewhere. Due to the bonding theory, on the other hand, the approach
would lead some Chinese companies with strong governance regimes considering listing
in the USA to instead list in Hong Kong, China or London.
Seeking leverage: a double-edge sword or a sword of Damocles
The US capital markets depend on rigorously enforced disclosure and corporate govern-
ance regulations that help to prevent fraud.119 The SEC can delist companies that are not
audited by PCAOB-registered firms, which has been rarely enforced because of the poten-
tial economic and political ramifications.120 If these companies were delisted because their
auditors were deregistered, effectively losing their licences to audit US-listed firms, then
the impact on the USA and China would be huge.
Delisting in the decoupling era?
Threatening to cut off access to US capital markets for Chinese companies is yet another
way for the USA to escalate its trade war with China.121 Chinese firms would no longer be
able to list in the USA should the decoupling contagion begin to infect capital markets.122
Many Chinese firms appear to be stung by the stereotyping effect following revelations of
Luckin’s fraud,123 which highlights the tremendous risk posed by such investments. The
Luckin scandal has cast suspicions on the due diligence process at accounting firms, and
115 Alissa Kole Amico, ‘The Problem with Foreign Issuers’ (Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, 23 June
2020) <https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/06/23/the-problem-with-foreign-issuers/#more-130490> accessed 10 August 2021.
116 Garen Markarian and Tobias Stockhausen, ‘Quo Vadis: Politics, Uncertainty and Saudi Aramco’ (2018) 11 (6) The Journal
of World Energy Law & Business 487, 505.
117 Alissa Kole Amico, ‘A Regulatory Race to the Bottom?’ Project Syndicate (14 August 2017).
118 Amico (n 115).
119 President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, Protecting United States Investors from Significant Risks (The Department
of the Treasury 24 July 2020) <https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/PWG-Report-on-Protecting-United-States-Investors-
from-Significant-Risks-from-Chinese-Companies.pdf> accessed 10 August 2021.
120 Benjamin Bain and Jenny Leonard, ‘Trump’s China Financial Decoupling Move Has Roots in Enron Saga’ Bloomberg Quint
(12 October 2019).
121 James Politi and Christian Shepherd, ‘US and China Strike “Phase One” Deal to De-Escalate Trade War’ Financial Times (13
December 2019).
122 Kevin Rudd, To Decouple or Not to Decouple? (Asian Society Policy Institute 4 November 2019) <https://asiasociety.org/pol
icy-institute/decouple-or-not-decouple> accessed 10 August 2021.
123 Lockett (n 24).
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provided new ammunition to PCAOB pursuing cross-border enforcement.124 In this vein,
allowing inspections would not seem to be a huge concession for China to make in a
settlement of the trade war. After all, any audit firm that registers with the PCAOB is legal-
ly obligated to cooperate and provide documents regardless of their locations.125 A refusal
to cooperate, either in an inspection or an investigation, could subject the firm to SEC or
PCAOB sanctions and remedial measures. Positively, the threatened delisting could lead
to ULCCs’ more credible disclosures and further enhance investors’ confidence. The last
thing could be that ULCCs would be likely to move somewhere else, if HFCAA were not
used properly as leverage to help PCAOB obtain inspection rights.
Implications on the US capital market
Delisting has been called a nuclear option, since it would effectively revoke the listing of
Chinese companies in the USA, with a potentially adverse impact on the Big Four, invest-
ors and the US stock exchanges.126 Goldman Sachs estimated that US investors currently
hold US$350 billion worth of Chinese American Depository Receipts (ADRs), represent-
ing roughly one-third of the ADR universe.127 More than 170 Chinese companies listed
on the NASDAQ and NYSE are facing increasing scrutiny.128 There are about 150 US-
listed firms that are headquartered or operate principally in China, which market capital-
ization is enormous in excess of $US2 trillion.129 With the potential for Chinese issuers to
move to other stock exchanges, the delisting could hurt the global competitiveness of US
stock exchanges. The ULCCs’ departure would result in a huge blow for Wall Street as the
centre of global finance, let alone a substantial loss to investors. The massive delisting
would undermine the ADR market, and the USA’s clout as a conduit for international
capital could be diminished.130 There would be a considerable tension between the SEC
and the Wall Street. The PCAOB has so far been unwilling to take unilateral action by
deregistering Chinese auditors it cannot inspect, likely due to opposition from capital
market participants. This creates opportunities for China to play one party off the
other.131 The sheer magnitude of mutual self-interests appears to be militating against any
significant decoupling.132 The prospects of delisting seem remote, because the large-scale
124 Jesse Fried, ‘Delisting Chinese Companies Plays Straight into Their Hands’ Financial Times (1 June 2021).
125 HFCAA s2(i) (2) (B).
126 Dave Michaels, ‘Chinese Companies Could Be Forced to Give Up U.S. Listings Under Senate Bill’ The Wall Street Journal (20
May 2020).
127 Narayanan Somasundaram, ‘China–US Clash over Stock Market Rules Casts Doubt over $1tn of Listings’
Nikkei Asian Review (2 June 2020).
128 NASDAQ Rule 5005(a) (37): ‘a “Restrictive Market” would be defined as “a jurisdiction that Nasdaq determines to have se-
crecy laws, blocking statutes, national security laws or other laws or regulations restricting access to information by regulators of
US-listed companies in such jurisdiction.”’
129 USCC, ‘Chinese Companies Listed on Major U.S. Stock Exchanges’ (Washington DC, USCC, 25 February 2019) <https://
www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Chinese%20Companies%20on%20U.S.%20Stock%20Exchanges.pdf> accessed 10 August 2021.
130 Ruwitch (n 92).
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mutual interests are at stake in keeping capital markets open.133 It remains unclear how
far the USA is willing to go in addressing the conflict.
5. Address the challenge: break the deadlock
A multipronged strategy is required to address the cross-border challenge. Effective audits
and regulatory oversight require timely multijurisdictional access to comprehensive infor-
mation. Adequate disclosure and deterring rogue issuers constitute the bedrock of sound
governance of capital markets. The Chinese market relies more on regulatory approval,
while the US market relies primarily on law enforcement and civil liability.134 A series of
checks and controls should be in place to work together to ensure high-quality, reliable fi-
nancial information.
Enhance deterrence from both Chinese and the US perspectives
There is extensive evidence on how the quality of accounting information affects a
company’s cost of capital.135 All ULCCs must be committed to financial transparency and
accountability under the US securities law, which is a prerequisite to being listed on US
exchanges.
The bonding theory accounts perfectly for how ULCCs can improve the protection of
investors in the USA. The operation of the ULCCs not only interprets the theory, but also
reflects how the resulting improved governance benefits global capital markets. The extent
to which the Chinese law contributes to the levelling of the playing field remains unclear.
Would Chinese law have teeth with extraterritorial effect?
The mile-stone CSL (2020) has extraterritorial effect, under which an article bans
overseas-listed Chinese companies from harming the interests of domestic investors.136
Regardless of a listing location, the firm should strictly abide by laws and regulations in
relevant markets, and fulfil obligations to make accurate disclosures. CSL 2020 empowers
Chinas securities agencies to regulate domestic companies overseas activities if they harm
the interests of domestic investors.137 The law provides a legal basis for the CSRC to inves-
tigate Luckin Coffee’s misconduct allegations. However, it is arguable whether the Luckin
Coffee scandal could trigger the long-arm jurisdiction given its rare application in the
133 Rudd (n 122).
134 Katharina Pistor and Chenggang Xu, ‘Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies: Lessons from China’ (2005) 7 (1)
American Review of Law and Economics 184, 210.
135 Richard A Lambert, Christian Leuz and Robert E Verrecchia, ‘Accounting Information, Disclosure, and the Cost of Capital’
(2007) 45 Journal of Accounting Research 385, 420.
136 The Standing Committee of the 13th National Peoples Congress (NPC) approved the revision of the Securities Law of the
Peoples Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as CSL 2020) on 28 December 2019, which came into effect on 1 March 2020;
China Securities Law 2020 art 2 (4).
137 China Securities Law 2020 art 2.
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governance of the Chinese capital market. Apart from the civil compensation Luckin
Coffee will likely be forced to pay,138 SAMR has fined Luckin Coffee ¥RMB 61 million
($8.98 million) for acts linked to its falsification of financial records and misleading of the
public.139 While China has recently changed regulations to punish instances of financial
fraud onshore, the penalties remain negligible.140 Previously, the cost of breaking the law
was too low in China. The maximum fine for false financial disclosures is ¥RMB 600,000
(US$87,000),141 while the top criminal punishment for hiding or destroying accounting
records is a prison term of five years and a fine of up to ¥RMB200,000 (US$28,000).142 In
order to enhance deterrence, it is imperative to increase prison terms and fines for capital-
markets misdeeds, and revoke the licences of intermediaries, including accounting firms,
that failed to fulfil their duties.143 Although the fine is increased up to ¥RMB 10 million
for fraudulent disclosure,144 it remains unclear whether the increased peculiar penalty
could effectively deter financial fraud. Institutionally, the CSRC, the Ministry of Finance
and the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants continue to handle audit super-
vision in China. This decentralized regulatory system might be responsible for the worry-
ing quality of auditing.145 To truly improve the quality of Chinese audits, it might be
useful to examine the PCAOB’s experience to see how to integrate the current decentral-
ized functions of Chinese regulators and advance reform of China’s audit supervision
system.146
The US commitment to enhance deterrence
Investors expect that ULCCs have been subject to a consistent level of due diligence, not
only upon initial listing, but also on a continuing basis.147 In practice, when the PCAOB
discloses its inability to inspect the audits of some ULCCs, these companies’ stock prices
react negatively.148 Investors would consider whether significant portions of the audit may
have been performed by firms in China, and the potential impact of the PCAOB’s inability
to access such audit work papers.149 American investors who are not fully informed about
138 China Securities Law 2020 art 85.
139 Jing Yang, ‘China Fines Luckin Coffee and Dozens of Firms That Helped It Inflate Results’ The Wall Street Journal (22
September 2020).
140 Yu (n 27).
141 China Securities Law 2005 art 193.
142 Chinese Criminal Law art 161.
143 China Securities Law 2020 art 213.
144 China Securities Law 2020 art 197.
145 Huanle Deng, ‘China Must Reform How It Supervises Auditors’ Caixin Global (10 January 2019).
146 Bin Ke, Clive S Lennox and Qingquan Xin, ‘The Effect of Chinas Weak Institutional Environment on the Quality of Big 4
Audits’ (2015) 90 (4) The Accounting Review 1591, 1619.
147 Elad Roisman, ‘Opening Remarks by Commissioner Roisman at the Emerging Markets Roundtable’ (Washington DC, SEC,
10 July 2010) <https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/07/10/opening-remarks-by-commissioner-roisman-at-the-emerging-mar
kets-roundtable/#more-131305> accessed 10 August 2021.
148 Clayton and others (n 2).
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the fundamentally weak nature of corporate governance of Chinese firms would be subject
to adverse risks.150 It is imperative that PCAOB and SEC raise investors’ awareness of the
risks.151 Otherwise, investors could be subject to substantial loss when making an invest-
ment decision based on false and misleading financial data. Arguably, ULCCs are obliged
to highlight the potential impacts of the PCAOB’s lack of access. They should disclose that
shareholders may have limited rights and remedies.152 Chinese laws may limit the legal
actions they can take against companies. The US enforcement agencies have substantial
difficulties in bringing and enforcing actions against ULCCs. The failure to make such dis-
closure might trigger SEC regulatory action.
Stock Exchanges are committed to ensuring that listing standards recognize the unique
risks posed by ULCCs. NASDAQ seeks to codify its authority to apply more stringent list-
ing criteria due to concerns about a company’s auditor and apply additional initial and
continued listing criteria to Restrictive Market (ie China) companies.153 Given Chinese
laws limiting access to information, NASDAQ has tightened requirements for companies
seeking to go public on its exchange.154 The new rules require those companies from the
Restrictive Market to raise $25 million in their IPO or, alternatively, at least a quarter of
their post-listing market capitalization.155 It is the first time that NASDAQ has required a
minimum offering size or public float by putting a minimum value on the size of IPOs.
NASDAQ would also apply additional listing criteria provided that an auditor could not
be inspected by PCAOB.156
Apart from the above approaches, further multipronged approaches are indispensable
to address the cross-border challenge. Holding individuals accountable is a central pillar
of the US enforcement strategies.157 For instance, Luckin’s top executives have been under
civil and criminal investigations in both China and the USA.158 Chief executive officers
(CEOs) and chief financial officers (CFOs) of public companies should be required to cer-
tify the accuracy of their financial statements. In the longer run, it always takes time for a
firm to nurture an ethical culture.
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Significance of cross-border regulatory cooperation
Securities and audit enforcement agencies share a common mission to protect investors
and foster market integrity.159 The current obstacles restrict PCAOB’s access to accounting
information, which significantly impact cross-border information sharing. For the sake of
effective oversight of audits, a paramount challenge hinges on whether Chinese regulators
will cooperate with SEC. Although the Chinese law allows SAMR to cooperate with its
foreign counterparts for joint inspection,160 SEC’s ability to enforce investor-protection
laws is limited in China.
Viable transplantation of other models
Behind the HFCAA is the contradiction between Chinas need to safeguard its sovereignty
and the USA’s need to protect investor rights.161 China has insisted that the PCAOB fol-
low the lead of the EU, which granted regulatory equivalency to China with respect to
audit regulation.162 Regulatory equivalency allows European regulators to rely on the
work of Chinese regulators as if it were their own. The PCAOB has not accepted the con-
cept of regulatory equivalency, insisting instead on at least joint inspections, for instance,
in Germany and France. There is valid concern that Chinese regulators do not have the
wherewithal to inspect the ULCCs’ audits,163 which are often offshore companies. Chinese
regulators would have neither expertise in US accounting and auditing rules nor adequate
incentives to rigorously examine overseas listed companies.164 China can learn from the
cooperation models that France and Germany have each set up with the USA, and build a
joint inspection mechanism led by China to effectively safeguard the interests of investors
and the two countries.165 Under the current decoupling trend, it is not viable for the
PCAOB to follow the lead of the EU and negotiate regulatory equivalency under which
the PCAOB would accept the work of Chinese regulators as its own. Neither could it be
possible for the USA to amend the Sarbanes–Oxley Act to remove the requirement that
the PCAOB inspect foreign accounting firms. HFCAA will strengthen the PCAOB’s bar-
gaining position with Chinese regulatory agencies.166 It remains to be seen whether the
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accessed 10 August 2021; PCAOB, ‘PCAOB Enters into Cooperative Agreement with French Audit Regulator’ (Washington DC,
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legislation could entail behavioural changes by the Chinese government, and allow
PCAOB to audit report of ULCCs headquartered in China.
Would cooperation be only a concept in the deadlock?
The global cooperation seems to be a viable win–win strategy, while trade wars and
zero-sum geopolitical competition undermine prosperity for all.167 Although China needs
foreign investors to revive its economy, it is unlikely to accept the US demand for full
PCAOB access as it regards it as a sovereignty issue.168 HFCAA forces ULCCs to submit to
greater regulatory oversight or face delisting. It requires a 3-year period of non-compli-
ance, and such a grace period gives Chinese and US regulators significant time to agree on
how best to regulate ULCCs.169 The tipping point is whether greater sanctions, like de-
registration, should apply against the ULCCs since the PCAOB finds violations in China
where it has only limited access. It is imperative for the USA and China to work in tandem
to address the inspection and compliance issue in a market-oriented approach based on
rule of law. There could be a possibility of settlement between the CSRC and SEC/
PCAOB, allowing some degree of document sharing that could alleviate many of the lat-
ter’s concerns. The CSL 2020 seeks to tighten corporate disclosure standards and makes it
easier for investors to sue company directors.170 Ideally, Chinese and US regulatory agen-
cies may reach an agreement to eliminate or significantly lessen difficulties presently sti-
fling the PCAOB’s ability to inspect those ULCCs’ audits.171
Overcome insurmountable barriers: is ‘co-audit arrangement’ a viable
middle way?
The President’s Working Group (PWG) on Financial Markets proposed a workaround for
the ULCCs faced with the underlying challenge of conflicting laws.172 Imposing an add-
itional PCAOB-registered audit firm report would have avoided Chinese accusations of
extraterritoriality but ensured that the benefit of a US listing comes with further scru-
tiny.173 The Chinese firms that do not comply with accounting standards risk being
delisted from US stock exchanges as of the end of 2021.174 They would be required to en-
gage an affiliated US-member registered public accounting firm that would serve as the
167 Will Moreland, ‘The Purpose of Multilateralism: A Framework for Democracies in a Geopolitically Competitive World’
Brookings (September 2019).
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principal auditor of the company’s financials through a co-audit arrangement.175 The US
accounting firm will then submit its audit-of-the-audit to the PCAOB. The auditing com-
mitment is ostensibly transferred from PCAOB to a private actor. A subsequent inquiry
arises as to whether a US audit firm would be willing to accept liability as principal auditor
through supervision. Even so, it remains unclear whether China would permit the co-
audit process, and whether a US auditor performing a co-audit of the Chinese company
would have access to the work papers. It is worth noting that the ‘co-audit concept’ has
not been included in the HFCAA. Whether this workaround would be an effective solu-
tion for the ULCCs caught between conflicting laws remains to be seen. China would then
likely adopt new countermeasures, if the co-audit alternative could be a way to get around
Chinese regulations. There is also uncertainty as to whether the rules would apply to newly
listing companies.
6. Conclusion
Audit quality and regulatory access to accounting reports play a vital role in maintaining
the integrity of the US capital market. In terms of protecting the integrity of US exchanges
and investors, higher levels of regulation may equate to increased compliance costs, but
can have a positive impact on investor confidence. A foreign issuer must comply with host
states’ financial reporting obligations wherever it has operations. The current rules of the
game fail to address capital raising by foreign issuers in premium markets sufficient to
protect investors. In particular, an inquiry remains over how to heighten the scrutiny of
US issuers based in China where it prevents full financial transparency. The PCAOB is
authorized to oversee the audits of all US-listed public companies in order to protect the
public interest by promoting informative, accurate and independent audit reports.
However, it faces hurdles given significant legal obstacles preventing it from obtaining the
information necessary in an inspection. China objects to the inspections as an impinge-
ment on its national sovereignty, and as a risk that national secrets might be disclosed. It is
unequitable for ULCCs to benefit from US capital markets while evading PCAOB’s inspec-
tions. The USA demonstrates a strong desire to take steps to reform the current legal and
regulatory landscape. HFCAA is thus designed to protect US investors from the significant
risks. HFCAA seeks to ensure that all companies on the US stock exchanges are subject to
the same standards and regulations. It is centred on strengthening protections for invest-
ors and promoting the integrity of the US capital markets through improving disclosure
and levelling the playing field. The Act would serve to resolve the longstanding conflict
over the inability of the PCAOB to examine the work of Chinese auditors that report on
the financial statements of US listed Chinese issuers. As an elephant in the room, a ULCC
is to be delisted if its auditor could not be inspected by the PCAOB for three consecutive
years.
175 Andrew Olmem, Christina Thomas and Jason Elder, ‘Congress Passes the “Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act”’
Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance (10 January 2021).
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A broader decoupling of the USA and Chinese economies is underway, while HFCAA
represents a significant escalation in tension and increasing friction between the two
powers in capital markets. HFCAA could significantly alter the auditing ecology of capital
markets, including revisions to exchange listing requirements in mainland China, Hong
Kong and secondary listings on alternative exchanges. Meanwhile, it could also lead to
massive delisting from the US exchanges. This requires unconventional wisdom for regu-
lators from the USA and China to innovatively address the deadlock, so that stock volatil-
ity could be avoided at a global level.
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